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CASENOTES
ADMIRALTY - COLLISION DAMAGES - FOURTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS THAT A TIME CHARTERER MAY RECOVER HIRE
PAID DURING DETENTION FROM THE VESSEL AT FAULT.
VENORE TRANSPORTATION CO. v. M/V STR UMA, 583 F.2d 708
(4th Cir. 1978).
In Venore Transportation Co. v. M/V Struma,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a time
charterer 2 of a vessel laid up for repairs as a result of a collision may
recover hire 3 paid to the owner during such period by bringing an
action against the vessel at fault in the collision. In reaching this
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's
holding in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint4 on the basis that
Venore, unlike Robins, involved a claim for hire paid rather than one
for profits lost as a result of the detention of the vessel. Because loss
of such hire is generally the measure of the owner's damages when
the charter party puts the vessel off-hire during the period the vessel

is laid up,5 the court concluded that its decision did not extend the

scope of the tortfeasor's liability beyond the Robins decision's
"foreclosure of remote damage claims. ' 6 The charter party 7 provision requiring the charterer to pay hire during detention was, in the
court's estimation, an allocation of the risk of loss of the vessel's use
1. 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978), noted in 10 J.

MAR.

L. & COM. 456 (1979).

2. A time charter is an agreement under which

[t]he owner provides the master and crew and undertakes the navigation

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

of the vessel and to maintain her in an efficient condition. But the
master although appointed by the owner, is placed "under the orders and
direction of the charterers as regard employment or agency." The owners
agree "to let" the vessel and the charterers "to hire" her "from the time
of delivery" until the date set for "her redelivery." The charterers are to
provide and pay for fuel supplies, port charges, pilotages, etc., and all
other expenses except those pertaining to the captain, officers or crew.
Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268, 278 (1940).
See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY §§ 4-14 to 4-19
(2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
Hire is the compensation paid by the charterer to the owner for the use of the
vessel. The time charter "is a contract for the use of a vessel for a specified
length of time, and the shipowner receives charterhire based on the duration of
the period the vessel remains at the charterer's disposal." N. HEALY & D.
SHARPE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 405 (1974) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as HEALY & SHARPE]. See generally O'Brien, Freight and
Charter Hire, 49 TUL. L. REv. 956 (1975).
275 U.S. 303 (1927).
The Yaye Maru, 274 F. 195, 200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921).
Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1978).
"A charter party is a specific contract, by which the owners of a vessel let the
entire vessel, or some principal part thereof, to another person, to be used by the
latter in transportation for his own account, either under their charge or his."
The New York, 93 F. 495, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 113 F. 810 (2d Cir. 1902).
For a discussion of the historical origin of the term "charter party" see H.
BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 12-1, at 395-96 (3d ed. 1979).
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that should
not operate to allow the vessel at fault to reduce her
8
liability.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF VENORE
The factual circumstances that brought the Venore case before
the Fourth Circuit are not unusual in maritime commerce. In
January of 1972, the Venore Transportation Company (Venore)
entered into a charter party with the Oswego Shipping Corporation
(Oswego) for the time charter of the S.S. Oswego Liberty for a period
of thirteen and one-half years. 9 On November 27, 1974, the Oswego
Liberty, while bound for Sparrows Point, Maryland, was struck
amidships on her port side by the M/V Struma at the Annapolis
Anchorage in the Chesapeake Bay. 10 As a consequence, the Oswego
Liberty was laid up for repairs at Annapolis, Maryland until
January 17, 1975.1 During this period Venore paid hire to Oswego in
the amount of approximately $225,000.00 as required by the terms of
the charter party.' 2 On October 17, 1975, Venore filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against
both the Struma and her owner, the Bulk Transportation Corporation (Bulk). In the interim Oswego had settled its claim against Bulk
for the expenses required
to repair the Oswego Liberty and put her
3
back into service.'
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Struma, reasoning that Robins and its progeny bar a time
charterer's recovery of any collision damages for loss of the
4
chartered vessel's use occasioned by the fault of another vessel.'
Venore appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of 1Appeals,
which
5
reversed the district court in a two-to-one decision.

8. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1978). Because
the charterer must pay hire in any event, and may not put the vessel off hire, this
form of charter is known in the maritime trade as a "hell or high water" charter.
9. Id. at 709.
10. Venore's allegation in its amended complaint (admitted by the Struma for
purposes of her motion for summary judgment) was that the Struma failed to
avoid the collision by passing astern of the Oswego Liberty as required by
Articles 19 and 22 of the Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 204, 207 (1976), notwithstanding advice from the Oswego Liberty's pilot that such a maneuver could have
been accomplished safely. Joint Appendix at 4-5, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V
Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978).
11. 583 F.2d at 709.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Joint Appendix at 77, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir.
1978). The district court's opinion was unreported. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V
Struma, Civil No. W-75-1499 (D. Md. April 25, 1977).
15. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978). Judge Butzner
joined in the majority opinion of Chief Judge Haynsworth. Judge Winter wrote a
dissenting opinion.
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II. THE ROBINS DOCTRINE
The concept that a time charterer has distinctly limited rights
with respect to the recovery of damages for loss of use of the
chartered vessel originated in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint.16 The United States Supreme Court held in Robins that a time
charterer could not recover damages for loss of the vessel's use from
a dry dock whose negligence delayed the chartered vessel's return to
service. 17 The terms of that charter party required the owner to
periodically lay up the vessel for repairs and maintenance. The
charter party further provided that the payment of hire was
suspended during such periods. In the course of one such period, the
owner contracted with the defendant to dry-dock the vessel. While
performing its duties, the dry dock negligently damaged the vessel's
propeller, which resulted in a two-week delay in the vessel's return to
service while awaiting the forging of a replacement. Although the
vessel's owner settled its claims, the charterer brought an action for
18
loss of use against the dry dock.
Initially, the time charterer's action in Robins met little
resistance. Although the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected a contention that the charterer could
recover as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the
owner and the dry dock,' 9 it nonetheless held that a claim in tort was
permissible to recover the lost use occasioned by the defendant's
negligence. 2° The Second Circuit's analysis indicated that it
considered the -result dictated by the conventional doctrine that
tortfeasors are liable for the foreseeable consequences of their
negligence. 21 The Supreme Court rejected this approach and reversed
the decision.

16. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

17. Id. at 309.
18. Id. at 307. In addition, the time charterer brought an in rem action against the
chartered vessel herself for the loss of her use. The United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of that
action. The Bjornefjord, 271 F. 682 (2d Cir. 1921).
19. Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1926), rev'd, 275 U.S.
303 (1927).
20. Id. at 5-6. The circuit court of appeals' opinion makes clear that the loss of use for
which the plaintiff sought recovery in Robins was actually the benefit of his
good bargain with the vessel owner. The lower court, unlike the Supreme Court,
expressly noted that "[iut appear[ed] from the evidence that the damages claimed
.. . represented the difference between the market value of the steamer for the
14-day loss of use, and .

.

. the charter hire for that period." Id. at 4.

21. The circuit court of appeals expressed its rationale as follows:
[R]ecognition of [a time charterer's] right of action involves no extension
of responsibility for results beyond those reasonably to be anticipated.
The damages which respondent must meet are limited to reimbursement
for the proximate results of its negligence. As this, however, has directly
affected several parties, each is entitled to his just share of the total
amount.
Id. at 6.
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Justice Holmes's opinion for the Court in Robins indicated that
the crucial inquiry is the determination of the nature of the
plaintiffs property interest in the negligently damaged ship. In
rejecting the Second Circuit's holding that the charterer's damages
were a foreseeable consequence of the dry dock's negligence, Justice
Holmes made clear that the time charterer's position as a contractor
for the use of the vessel was insufficient to establish a proprietary
interest that would support a cause of action against a tortfeasor for
loss of use. 22 In so holding, however, the Court did not differentiate
between a loss of use measured by loss of anticipated profits from
the vessel and one measured by loss of hire paid to the owner.
Almost twenty years later, the Second Circuit was called upon to
reconsider Robins in the context of an action to recover hire paid
during detention. In Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co., 23 a
ship owner sought to recover the full hire that would have been due
during detention, despite the fact that the time charterer was
required by the terms of the charter party to pay half-hire during
that period. In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the Second
Circuit held that Robins foreclosed the owner's action for the hire to
the extent that it had been
paid, including recovery by the owner on
24
behalf of the charterer.
Subsequent decisions by other courts have given Robins broad
significance. Because of Justice Holmes's holding that unintentional
injury to a contractual relationship is not actionable, 25 courts have
denied numerous damage claims in maritime tort cases on the basis
that damages for the loss of a business expectancy were not
recoverable absent a showing of the defendant's knowledge of the

22. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S 303, 308-09 (1927). Justice
Holmes observed that,
[N]o authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at least, a
tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor
liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.... The law does not
spread its protection so far.
Id. at 309.
Although the Court did not address the issue, presumably a demise charterer's
interest in the vessel would be sufficient to support recovery on the Robins facts.
See, e.g., In re M/V Vulcan, 553 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 855 (1977). In the Vulcan a charterer of a drilling rig "under long-term
bareboat charter" was allowed to recover damages for loss of use from the
tortfeasor. Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Mar Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977), the court noted in dictum
that the applicability of Robins to the rights of demise charterers "has not yet
been ruled on." Id. at 957. With respect to the distinction between a time
charterer's and a demise charterer's interest in the chartered vessel, see GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 2, at § 4-1, and note 33 infra.
23. 153 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946), noted in 59 HARV. L. REV.
619 (1946).
24. Id. at 871-72.
25. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
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contract. 26 In addition, several courts have expressed the view prior
to Venore that a time charterer has no standing to recover on any
claim against a tortfeasor arising from damage to the chartered
27
vessel.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S VENORE OPINION
The Fourth Circuit reached its decision on the rationale that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Robins was not controlling with respect
to the Venore facts. The most significant factor in the court's
analysis was the charter party provision in Venore, unlike Robins,
that required the time charterer to pay hire during the period the
Oswego Liberty was laid up for repairs. 28 Relying upon this
distinction, the court developed a three-step justification for its
result.
The first and most significant step in this rationale was the
Venore court's view that Robins established what "is essentially a
principle of disallowance of damages because of remoteness, and
because of the concern that the number and the amount of potential
claims in a given instance may be staggering." 29 The Fourth Circuit
observed that the "payment for loss of use of the damaged vessel is a

26. E.g., In re Great Lakes Towing Co., 395 F. Supp. 810, 811-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(dock workers' claim for lost wages against tortfeasor who damaged equipment

provided by dock owner for their work held barred by Robins); cf. Henderson v.
Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152, 159 (D. Md. 1966) (amendment alleging
interference with contractual relationship could not avoid Robins bar against
claim by damaged vessel's crew for lost wages), aff'd per curiam, 384 F.2d 998
(4th Cir. 1967).
27. E.g., Rederi A/B Soya v. Evergreen Marine Corp., 1972 A.M.C. 1555, 1567 (E.D.
Va. 1971) (a time charterer "does not have legal standing to recover.., damages
for loss of profits or loss of hire of the vessel"), aff'd, 1973 A.M.C. 538 (4th Cir.
1972); Dampskibsaktieselskabet Den Norske Afrika og Australieline v. Intalco
Aluminum Corp., 306 F. Supp. 170, 176 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (time charterer "has no
direct right to recover against the tort-feasor of owner"), aff'd sub nom.
Dampskibsaktieselskabet v. Bellingham Stevedoring Co., 457 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
In addition, one English authority observed that,
A charterer not by demise cannot, since he is not in possession of the
ship, recover as damages for negligence from a tortfeasor, who has
damaged the ship, the loss of use of the ship during repairs for which
time he may under the time charter remain liable to pay hire.
A. MOCATTA, M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, SCRUTTON ON CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLS
OF LADING 49 (18th ed. 1974). See also Konstantinidis v. World Tankers Corp.,
[1965] 2 All E.R. 139, 155 ("There is no reported case, so far as I am aware, in the
long history of chartering where a time charterer has recovered damages for
pecuniary loss because of damage by a third party to the chartered vessel.").
28. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1978). The
charter party between Venore and Oswego did not contain the conventional
breakdown clause. Rather it provided, in pertinent part, that "the hire shall be
payable in all events and without interruption for any cause during the entire
period of this Charter." Joint Appendix at 38, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V
Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978).
29. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1978).
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conventional item of recovery." 3 Indeed, a tortfeasor's liability to a
vessel owner for loss of use resulting from a collision is well
established
in cases in which the damaged vessel is less than a total
31
loss.

Thus, the court reasoned that absent the charter party

provision, the Struma would have been liable to Oswego for off-hire
caused by the collision. Because Venore's claim for recovery of hire
paid would not extend the Struma's liability beyond the amount she
would have owed Oswego absent Venore's contractual obligation to
pay hire while the Oswego Liberty was laid up, the court concluded
32
that such a claim was not so remote as to be barred by Robins.
The court's second step was to rebut the Struma's argument that
Venore did not have a possessory interest in the Oswego Liberty
sufficient to support a claim for the hire paid. As the Fourth Circuit
noted, "[i]t is only in a highly technical sense that the time charterer
may be said not to be in possession of the vessel. '33 Because the time
charterer has the control of the commercial use of the vessel, the
court concluded that such a charterer should
have standing to
34
recover hire paid to obtain such an interest.
30. Id.
31. Hewlett v. Barge Bertie, 418 F.2d 654, 657 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1021 (1970). When the damaged vessel is under time charter, the amount of the
charter hire is the prima facie measure of the owner's damages for loss of use.
The Yaye Maru, 274 F. 195, 199-200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921);
The Brand, 224 F. 391, 394-95 (3d Cir. 1915); cf. Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil &
Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869, 871 (2d Cir.) ("hire cannot be the measure of the loss
of either owner or charterer" should charter rates fluctuate significantly after the
charter party is made) (dictum), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946).
Should the vessel be a total loss as a consequence of the collision, however,
the owner's damages are measured by "the vessel's market value immediately
preceding the collision." Greer v. United States, 505 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam). For a discussion of the desirability of adopting the loss of use
standard in total loss cases, see Comment, Loss of Use as an Item of Damages in
Admiralty Collision Cases, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 311 (1978).
32. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978).
33. Id. This "technical sense" is predicated upon the distinction between demise and
time charters. One court has observed that a "time charter is an agreement for
space on a vessel and, as distinguished from a demise or bareboat charter, gives
the charterer no property interest in the vessel." Klishewich v. Mediterranean
Agencies, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 712, 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Thus, it is frequently stated
that a demise charterer "is the owner pro hac vice of [the] vessel. All in personam
liabilities arising out of the ship's operation are brought home to . . .the demise
charterer." Offshore Tel. Co. v. M/V Waterbuck, 465 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (E.D. La.
1979) (emphasis in original). Consequently, a demise charter is "tantamount to,
though just short of, an outright transfer of ownership." Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369
U.S. 698, 700 (1962). A time charterer on the other hand merely has "the right to
use the carrying facilities of the vessel and to direct her movements during the
charter term." HEALY & SHARPE, supra note 3, at 405. See generally Cibro Sales
Corp. v. M/V Asphalt Merchant, 1978 A.M.C. 2546, 2548-49 (D.N.J. 1978) ("there
are significant legal differences between a demise and time charter"); GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 2, at § 4-20.
34. The time charterer contracts for "the right to use the carrying facilities of the
vessel and to direct her movements during the charter term." HEALY & SHARPE,
supra note 3, at 405. The court's discussion in Venore makes clear that it views
these rights as significant enough to create a possessory interest in the v~ssel to
the extent of hire paid. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th
Cir. 1978).

19791

Venore Transp. Co. v. MIV Struma

557

Finally, the Fourth Circuit harmonized its holding in Venore
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Robins. The court emphasized
that its decision permitted a time charterer to recover only hire paid
to the owner, and not to charge its lost profit to the tortfeasor as
well. The latter claim had been precluded by Robins, the court
reasoned, but its decision in Venore merely permitted a recovery not
addressed in Robins.35 The court concluded, therefore, that its
decision did not conflict with the doctrine formulated by the
Supreme Court.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Winter, however, found the
facts in Venore to be controlled by the Robins decision. The dissent
would have affirmed the district court on the rationale that Robins
had not denied recovery "on the ground that the damages were too
remote, but on the ground that a time charterer has no standing or
' '36
property interest to recover from an unintentional wrongdoer.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Venore represents an attempt to
harmonize two opposing legal theories of tort liability. The Robins
doctrine holds negligent tortfeasors liable only for damages to
known contractual relationships. 37 The Robins bar on claims
resulting from negligent interference with contractual relations,
38
however, has been frequently applied with reluctance by the courts,
39
and has received criticism from commentators.
Despite such
35. The Fourth Circuit distinguished its prior decision in Rederi A/B Soya v.
Evergreen Marine Corp., 1972 A.M.C. 1555 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 1973
A.M.C. 538 (4th Cir. 1972), on the ground that it involved a time charterer's claim
for lost profits barred by Robins, rather than a claim for hire paid. Venore
Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1978).
In addition, the court implied that Venore was a case of first impression by
distinguishing other Robins cases on the ground that claims for remote damages
were involved, and by refusing to follow the English case of Chargeurs Reunis
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. English & Am. Shipping Co., 9
Lloyds List L.R. 464 (Ct. App. 1921), despite similar factual circumstances. The
Fourth Circuit observed that it had "found no American case reaching a similar
conclusion, and we think that on principle we should not follow the early lead of
the English Court of Appeal." Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708,
710 (4th Cir. 1978).
36. 583 F.2d at 711 (Winter, J., dissenting).
37. In the words of Justice Holmes, "a tort to the person or property of one man does
not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was
under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong." Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (emphasis added).
38. E.g., Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th
Cir. 1978) ("the rule based upon [Robins] is too well-settled to be overturned by a
panel of this court"), cert denied, 99 S. Ct. 1215 (1979); Federal Commerce &
Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F. Supp. 908, 913 (S.D.N.Y.) ("were this
Court now free to write upon a tabula rasa and not constrained by the weight of
a precedent, we would reject the negligent interference with contract doctrine"),
aff'd per curiam, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976).
39. E.g., Harper, Interference with ContractualRelations, 47 Nw. UL. REV. 873, 88489 (1953); James, Limitation of Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 55-58 (1972).
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criticism, Robins continues to be an influential precedent with
respect to both maritime 40 and non-maritime tort liability.4
The alternative to the Robins approach is the foreseeability test
enunciated in the Second Circuit's opinion in In re Kinsman Transit
42
Co.

Under the Kinsman analysis the tortfeasor's liability turns on

whether "the connection between the defendant's negligence and the
claimants' damages is too tenuous and remote to permit recovery. ' 43
The Kinsman remoteness - foreseeability analysis is now frequently
applied by courts determining the extent of a tortfeasor's liability. 44
Although the influence of Kinsman may be strong with respect
to maritime torts in general, 45 Robins remains the controlling
precedent with respect to a time charterer's rights against a
tortfeasor. 46 Even the Second Circuit has concurred in the view that
"the Robins decision must be adhered to by the lower federal courts,
at least in instances involving the factual contours of that case. ' 47
The difficulty with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Venore stems
from its seeming merger of the holdings in Robins and Kinsman.
Although the Venore court interpreted Robins as establishing "a
principle of disallowance of damages because of remoteness," 48 other
courts, as did the dissent, 49 analyze the case in terms of the

40. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
In a recent Robins case, the Fifth Circuit held that a railroad's claim for loss
of use damages from a tug that struck a bridge was barred by Robins because the
railroad's "right to use the bridge has none of the incidents of ownership
attributable to the demise-charterer that would justify recovery for damage to
physical property." Louisville & N.R.R. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469,
474 (5th Cir. 1979). Although the Boyou Lacombe court implied that the
railroad's position was analogous to that of a time charterer, the opinion does
not mention the Fourth Circuit's Venore opinion. Id. Thus, Venore's impact upon
related fields of admiralty law is as yet undetermined.
41. Compare Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 168, 583 P.2d
721, 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867, 874 (1978) and North Carolina State Ports Auth. v.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 294 N.C. 73, 87-89, 240 S.E.2d 345, 354 (1978) (no
liability for unintentional interference with contractual obligations) with Olson
v. Iacometti, 91 Nev. 241, 245-46, 533 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1975) and Graham & Hill v.
Davis Oil Co., 486 P.2d 240, 241 (Wyo. 1971) (plaintiff may only recover on
negligence that breaches contract in which plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary).
42. 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
43. Id. at 825.
44. E.g., In re Lyra Shipping Co., 360 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. La. 1973). In Lyra
Shipping the court held that a vessel negligently blocking a canal was not liable
under Kinsman for the loss of a vessel at sea in heavy weather occasioned by the
necessity to detour the canal. Id. at 1192-94.
45. Id.
46. E.g., Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F. Supp.
908, 915 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 975 (1976).
47. Id.
48. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1978).
49. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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plaintiffs standing rather than the remoteness of his damages.50
These two approaches would appear to be irreconcilable. 51
The Fourth Circuit's ability to distinguish Venore from Robins
on the facts is convincing, but its opinion fails to articulate effectively
its true rationale because of the court's desire to harmonize its
holding with Robins. The court's brief analysis of the requirement
that Venore pay hire during detention nonetheless reveals the actual
rationale for its holding. The court observed that such a provision in
the "charter party has transferred the risk of loss of use from the
owner to the time charterer."5 2 Unfortunately, the court does not
explain its reasoning, but the theory would seem to parallel other
courts' reasoning that either an idemnity agreement53 or a right of
subrogation 54 allows a time charterer who has paid hire during
detention to avoid the Robins bar. Both theories merely change the
party to whom the 55tortfeasor is ultimately liable, rather than
increase his liability.
50. See, e.g., Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 392 F. Supp.
908, 910-11 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 975 (1976).
51. See note 28 supra.
52. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978).
53. Express charter provisions couched in terms of indemnification have avQided the
bar to a time charterer's recovery. In United States v. Panama Transp. Co., 174
F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1959), the court
held that a charter party provision stipulating that the charterer must indemnify
the owner for hire lost subrogated the charterer to the owner's right to recover
once the hire was paid as indemnity against the owner's loss. The court
expressly stated that "the cases of Robins . . . and Agwilines ... are not

applicable here." Id. at 595. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada held in
Deep Sea Tankers Ltd. v. SS. "Tricape", 16 D.L.R.2d 600 (Can. 1958), that a
similar clause required the owner to refund any indemnity to the extent that the
hire was recovered from the negligent vessel. Id. at 602-03.
Following the collision between the Struma and the Oswego Liberty, Venore
and Oswego signed an indemnification agreement as an amendment to the
charter party. Joint Appendix at 60-61, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583
F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978).
54. The concept of subrogation was not discussed in Venore. A district court utilized
the concept, however, in Dampskibsaktieselskabet Den Norske Afrika og
Australieline v. Intalco Aluminum Corp., 306 F. Supp. 170, 176 (W.D. Wash.
1969), aff'd sub nom. Dampskibsaktieselskabet v. Bellingham Stevedoring Co.,
457 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), to allow a time charterer
to recover hire paid under the good faith belief that he had no right to put the
vessel off-hire under the breakdown clause. The vessel in Intalco was delayed in
unloading because the only shoreside crane collapsed onto the deck. There the
court cited Robins for the proposition that the charterer could not recover directly
against the tortfeasor. Nonetheless, the court held that the charterer's payment
of hire during the detention subrogated him to the owner's right to recover from
the tortfeasor. Such a theory would clearly apply only to the extent of the
charterer's payments to the owner, and would thus like Robins and Venore not
allow a charterer's claim for lost profits because the subrogation extends only to
the limit of payment of hire by the charterer.
55. The tortfeasor's liability is not increased because absent the time charterer's
agreement to pay hire during detention, a collision would put the vessel off-hire,
and the lost hire would be the prima facie measure of the owner's damages for
loss of use. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
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For reasons not articulated in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the
result reached by the court is analytically defensible. Absent the
charter party provision, Oswego would have an incontrovertable
right to be made whole for the loss of the vessel's use, defined to
include lost profits and measured by the charter hire the owner
would have received but for the tortious act of the third party.5 6 As
befits a more remote plaintiff, however, Venore is accorded only a
limited remedy. Its damages may not include profits lost as a result
of the third party's tort, 57 but rather are measured by the charter
hire paid during the detention of the vessel. 58 The seeming anomaly
that, although in each instance the damages are differently defined,
the plaintiffs receive identical sums, is more apparent than real.
Charter hire is reflected on the books of the owner as revenue, a
portion of which constitutes the owner's profit. For Venore, as a time
charterer, hire is an expense of doing business. The time charterer
realizes a profit only through use of the vessel in conducting its
business.
Moreover, the court's decision is further justified if one contrasts
the relative positions of the owner and time charterer in the event
either were to be denied damages. For the owner, detention of the
vessel means the interruption of the stream of revenue (charter hire)
flowing from ownership of a productive asset. Contrast, however, the
position of the time charterer. Not only is his stream of revenue cut
off, but also he would be required to continue paying charter hire resulting in a net loss of funds over and above his loss of the use of a
productive asset. The time charterer may be less proximately
situated, yet he can demonstrate that he will suffer more onerous
harm than would the owner were he denied recovery of charter hire.
Thus, as the Venore court indicated, the time charterer has assumed
the "risk of loss of use"5 9 of the vessel, thereby insuring the owner's
continued and uninterrupted flow of income. Consequently, the
limited right of recovery against the tortfeasor accorded the time
charterer under such circumstances seems more than justified.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Venore exemplifies the difficulty
that courts encounter when dealing with the stare decisis force of the
Robins decision. The court's reluctance to permit an admitted
tortfeasor to reduce his collision liability based upon the fortuity of

56. See id.
57. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978) ("We do not
intend to suggest, however, that the time charterer is entitled to lost profits.").
58. Id. at 709 ("recovery of charter hire should be allowed").
59. Id. at 711.
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the form of the innocent vessel's charter, 60 led it to devote its
attention to distinguishing Venore from Robins, rather than to
explaining the legal theory utilized to reach its result. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the decision will doubtless be welcomed by
time charterers operating under similar circumstances. Likewise,
owners may use the decision in the future as a bargaining point to
vessel's use
persuade time charterers to bear the risk of the chartered
61
by agreeing to continue to pay hire during detention.
Although the Fourth Circuit's Venore decision may be an
erosion of the Robins doctrine, it nonetheless creates only a limited
exception. The court expressly stated that it recognized no more than
a time charterer's right to recover hire paid during detention, which
62
right does not extend to profits lost while the vessel was laid up.
Whether the Venore decision will initiate a full-scale erosion of the
Robins doctrine awaits future decisions by other courts of appeals or
the Supreme Court.
David Eugene Rice

60. This anomaly was an early source of judicial criticism of the Robins doctrine. It

was observed that agreement to pay hire during detention leads to the "rather
startling result that [the owner of the vessel at fault] receives the bonanza of a
substantial reduction in damages through the mere chance that its victim has a
favorable contract with another." Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co.,
153 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 835 (1946).
61. The willingness of Venore to agree to pay hire during detention in this case may
be explained by the commercial relationship of the parties. The Oswego Liberty
was built by the Marven Steamship Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, in 1965. In 1972, Oswego entered into a purchase
agreement with Marven Steamship Corporation, and simultaneously time
chartered the Oswego Liberty to Venore, another wholly owned subsidiary of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Appellant's Brief at 3, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V
Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978). Apparently, Venore's agreement was
intended to ensure a constant source of income from which Oswego could meet
its financial obligations to Marven Steamship Corporation under the purchase
agreement.
In addition, Venore was apparently either operating or directing the
commercial use of the Oswego Liberty for Marven Steamship Corporation prior
to the sale to Oswego. In his deposition, Anthony J. Germano, the Shipping Vice
President of Venore, testified as follows:
Q. When the vessel was sold by Marven to Oswego Shipping Corporation, what then happened to the OSWEGO LIBERTY insofar as the
shipping subsidiaries were concerned?
A. Nothing. She continued right on as we were handling her before.
Joint Appendix at 26, Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir.
1978) (emphasis added).
62. Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711 (4th Cir. 1978).

